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INTRODUCTION
Sarah, an eight-year-old girl, could not wait for her third-grade
field trip to the Museum of Natural History. Best of all, her mother,
Jill, who normally worked both a full-time job during the week and a
part-time job on the weekend, took the day off to chaperone the trip.
Just after pulling out of the elementary-school parking lot, a truck
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came speeding down the road and struck the school bus carrying Sa-
rah's class. Sarah was severely injured and rushed by ambulance to
the nearby hospital. Jill, uninjured, held Sarah in the ambulance and
carried her into the emergency room. Within minutes, Jill found her-
self removed to the waiting room without ever speaking to a doctor
about Sarah's condition. Although Sarah has always known Jill as her
mom, legally, Jill is merely a stranger. Patty, Sarah's biological mother
and Jill's partner, is the legal parent and the only one vested with the
authority to make medical decisions on behalf of Sarah.
Due to a combination of state marriage laws and adoption stat-
utes, most same-sex couples with children must make a very difficult
decision-designating one parent as the legal parent. Most adoption
laws state that a natural parent's participation in an adoption com-
pletely severs his or her legal rights.' These laws leave the meaning of
participation ambiguously broad and thereby inclusive of processes
such as second-parent adoption. Jill's adoption of Sarah would there-
fore completely divest Patty's legal parentage. Although state adop-
tion laws often have a spousal/stepparent exception, which allows
second-parent adoption without severing the biological parent's legal
parent-child relationship, this exception does not provide a solution
to most same-sex couples living in states that do not provide legally
effective same-sex partnerships. Therefore, despite sharing equal pa-
rental responsibility and raising Sarah together from an early age,
Patty and Jill must decide who will be Sarah's legal mother.
The United States is currently enmeshed in a national debate
over same-sex marriage. The debate is occurring in courtrooms as
much as at the polls and in state and national legislatures. However,
the legal system must address "trickle down" issues stemming from,
but extending beyond, the scope of simply determining the particular
legal status granted to a homosexual relationship. 2 One major trickle
down issue, though often left out of the public discourse, concerns
parental determination for children of same-sex couples. Left even
further outside pundit discussions, however, is how this parental de-
termination for children of same-sex couples affects the children's in-
heritance rights under the laws of intestate succession. The latter
concern is the principal subject of this Note.
Second-parent adoption, in theory, provides an opportunity for a
nonbiological parent to forge a legal relationship with his or her part-
ner's biological child (who usually is either from a previous relation-
ship, or born to the couple through in vitro fertilization, surrogacy, or
I See discussion and sources cited infra Part I.C.
2 See generally Margaret S. Osborne, Note, Legalizing Families: Solutions to Adjudicate
Parentage for Lesbian Co-Parents, 49 VILL. L. REv. 363, 365-66 (2004).
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other similar alternative method) . While second-parent adoption al-
lows a heterosexual stepparent family to forge a legal relationship be-
tween the child and both parents,4 similarly situated homosexual
couples must overcome several obstacles.5 The most significant obsta-
cle is what is known as the "cut-off provision," which most state adop-
tion statues include.6 This provision leads to Jill and Patty's
predicament-second-parent adoption severs the legal parent-child
relationship between the child and biological parent in order to cre-
ate a legal relationship between the child and nonbiological parent.
The spousal/stepparent exception that prevents divestment of the le-
gal relationship between the biological parent and child during a sec-
ond-parent adoption remains unavailable for most same-sex couples
living in states that do not grant the legal status of spouse to same-sex
partners.7
This Note will analyze the impact of the cut-off provision on
same-sex couples and their children, focusing on this legal doctrine's
impact on intestacy law. Principally, this Note discusses the par-
ent-child provisions in the Uniform Probate Code and argues that
the "simultaneous" adoption8 solution, which the court articulated in
Sharon S. v. Superior Court,9 should extend beyond the context of adop-
tion and parentage laws to the analogous cut-off provisions in intestate
laws. When read to maintain legislative intent and ensure the best
interest of the child, provisions in the Uniform Probate Code10 defin-
ing a legal parent-child relationship for the purposes of intestate suc-
cession should follow a presumption of simultaneous adoption.
Courts should interpret the cut-off provision as a default, but waivable,
benefit for the adoptive parent and not as a mandatory requirement.
In the context of same-sex couples seeking second-parent adoption,
this Note proffers simultaneous adoption in lieu of sequential adop-
tion'1 because simultaneous adoption would allow an adoptive parent
to consent to the maintenance of the legal relationship between the
natural parent and the child, so that a nonbiological same-sex part-
3 See Susan N. Gary, The Parent-Child Relationship Under Intestacy Statutes, 32 U. MEM. L.
REv. 643, 659 (2002).
4 See id. at 657.
5 See id. at 658.
6 See id.
7 See id.
8 I use this phrase to denote the maintenance of the legal parent-child relationship
between the natural parent and the child while "simultaneously" establishing a legal par-
ent-child relationship between the adoptive parent and the child. In contrast, I define
sequential" adoption as the severance of the legal parent-child relationship between the
natural parent and the child while creating such a legal relationship with the "new" adop-
tive parent. The latter directly results from the cut-off provision.
9 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
10 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2010).
11 See Gary, supra note 3, at 657.
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ner's adoption does not sever the right of the child to inherit from the
biological parent. 12
Part I of this Note provides historical background, including a
general overview of family law jurisprudence and the constitutional
protection of families, second-parent adoption laws, the relevant im-
pact of same-sex marriage laws, and the resulting cut-off problem.
Part II describes and evaluates proposed solutions to the cut-off prob-
lem, principally focusing on the solution articulated in Sharon S. Part
III discusses inheritance under the Uniform Probate Code as an ex-
ample of state intestacy laws. Part IV applies the solutions in Part II to
the Uniform Probate Code parent-child relationship provisions,
which include a cut-off provision. Finally, the Note concludes by plac-
ing this issue within a larger, more abstract understanding of the con-
stitutional protections for children and families.
I
BACKGROUND
A. Family Law Jurisprudence and the Protection of Families
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects
parents' fundamental liberty interest "in the care, custody, and con-
trol of their children."13 While states have some power to regulate the
family, this power is expressly limited to a state interest in protecting
children from parental abuse or harm. 14 Thus, parents have the right
to guide the upbringing of their child, so long as the child is not
harmed.' 5
After recognizing parents' general privacy-based protection to
guide the upbringing of their child, the Supreme Court eventually
12 This Note will set aside the civil procedure aspects of this issue, such as the implica-
tions of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. An
individual state's recognition of a child's inheritance rights if that child is adopted in a
different state is beyond the scope of this Note. Additionally, this Note assumes homosex-
ual parents are as fit as heterosexual parents to raise children. Studies have demonstrated
that because "parental sexual orientation per se has no measurable effect on the quality of
parent-child relationships or on children's mental health or social adjustment, there is no
evidentiary basis for considering parental sexual orientation in decisions about children's
'best interest.'" Judith Stacey & Timothy J. Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation ofPar-
ents Matter, 66 AM. Soc. REV. 159, 176 (2001).
13 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745, 753 (1982) (establishing that parents have a protected liberty interest "in the care,
custody, and management of their child"); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978)
("[T]he relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected."); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972) (acknowledging the fundamental right of parents to
guide the religious upbringing of their children without government intrusion).
14 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (suggesting that states have
some power to regulate families and that the state's interest "as parens patriae' in protecting
children from harm can limit the fundamental right to control a child's upbringing).
15 See sources cited supra notes 13-14.
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began to articulate specific protections for diverse family structures.
In Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland,'6 the Court refused to adopt a narrow
definition of family that would lead to protections solely for tradi-
tional nuclear families.' 7 In Moore, the Court struck down a single-
family zoning ordinance that excluded a family consisting of a grand-
mother, her son, his child, and another grandchild.18 In Smith v. Or-
ganization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform,'9 the Court further
expanded the definition of family to encompass individuals without a
blood, marriage, or adoptive relationship. 20
Despite this history of articulated protections for both traditional
and some nontraditional families, these protections do not appear to
extend fully to families headed by same-sex couples.2' For example,
many statutes, especially those relating to marriage and adoption, fail
to use sexual-orientation neutral language; instead, they employ terms
such as "spouses" and "husband and wife." 22 Another very real and
16 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
17 See id. at 503-04 ("[T]he Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion. . . . Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the
members of the nuclear family... .").
18 See id. at 505-06.
19 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
20 See id. at 843-44 (noting that a deep, loving relationship between an adult and
child may exist even in the absence of a blood connection). Although a blood relationship
to the child is insufficient to establish parental rights, it remains strongly presumptive. In
Troxel, Justice John Paul Stevens stated that biology alone is not enough to establish an
absolute right to constitutional protection of the parent-child relationship. Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 87 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority in Lehr v. Robertson
affirmed the view that biology acted almost as a (significant) first step in establishing the
"enduring relationship" necessary for constitutional protection. Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 259-61 (1983). Therefore, although biology alone is insufficient to establish
parental rights, it is significant, and generally, parentage law requires only that the parent
demonstrate some additional sense of parental responsibilities, including assisting in rais-
ing the child or investing in the child's future. State courts have followed this perspective
on the role of biology. See, e.g., State v. Wooden, 57 P.3d 583, 588-89 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)
("[A] biological connection, by itself, does not automatically confer parental rights, but
that mere physical absence, by itself, does not automatically waive them."); Randy A.J. v.
Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 636 (Wis. 2004) ("[P]arental status that rises to the level of a
constitutionally protected liberty interest does not rest solely on biological factors, but
rather, is dependant upon an actual relationship with the child. . . .").
21 The Supreme Court has not spoken on this issue directly, but the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court has specifically recognized the right of children to be free from
discrimination in state benefits because of the sexual orientation of their parents. See
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 964 (Mass. 2003) ("It cannot be ra-
tional under our laws, and indeed it is not permitted, to penalize children by depriving
them of State benefits because the State disapproves of their parents' sexual orientation.").
However, very few cases specifically address protections for same-sex families.
22 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(b) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 50 (Supp.
2010) (declaring that "[a] parent-child relationship exists between an individual who is
adopted by the spouse of either genetic parent").
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significant government intrusion that impacts same-sex couples and
their children is the cut-off provision in most state adoption laws. 2 3
B. Same-Sex Families24
The 2000 Census reported that 34.3% of lesbian couples and
22.3% of gay male couples were raising children.25 New technologies
have gradually increased the opportunity for same-sex couples to raise
biologically related children. Among lesbian couples, a majority utilize
some method of artificial insemination, 26 which is one of the oldest
and most common forms of assisted-reproduction technology.27 As a
consequence of artificial insemination, the biological mother auto-
matically gains parental status, while the nonbiological parent must
seek out legal parentage. 28
A majority of gay male couples pursue surrogacy or gestational
surrogacy.29 With surrogacy, the sperm donor (the biological father)
automatically gains parental status.30 Similar to the nonbiological les-
bian individual above, the nonbiological parent must work to gain le-
gal parental rights.3 ' Whether in the context of gay male couples or
lesbian couples, all of these technologies are just "the tip of an iceberg
of a myriad of ways where legal issues concerning parentage arise in
the context of the non-traditional family."32
Finally, adoption is another common method that both lesbians
and gay males use.3 3 It is important to differentiate between adop-
tion, in which both individuals seek to establish legal adoptive
parenthood over a child, and second-parent adoption, in which one
parent is the legal, biological parent-either through surrogacy, artifi-
cial insemination, or from a previous relationship-and the biological
23 See generally Jason N.W. Plowman, When Second-Parent Adoption Is the Second-Best Op-
tion: The Case for Legislative Reform as the Next Best Option for Same-Sex Couples in the Face of
Continued Marriage Inequality, 11 SCHOLAR 57, 63 (2008).
24 For the purposes of this Note, I use the phrase "same-sex families" to refer to
families headed by same-sex couples.
25 Plowman, supra note 23, at 59.
26 See Emily Doskow, The Second Parent Trap: Parenting for Same-Sex Couples in a Brave
New World, 20 J. Juv. L. 1, 2 (1999).
27 See ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECH-
NOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 86 (1995); Karin Mika & Bonnie Hurst, One Way to Be
Born? Legislative Inaction and the Posthumous Child, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 993, 996 (1996). For a
general discussion of alternative methods for reproduction, see Charles P. Kindregan, Jr.,
Thinking About the Law of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 27 Wis. J. FAM. L. 123 (2007).
28 See Doskow, supra note 26, at 2.
29 See id. at 3.
30 See id.
3' See id.
32 See Lee-ford Tritt, Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally Based Approach to
Parent-Child Property Succession, 62 SMU L. REv. 367, 392 (2009).
33 See Doskow, supra note 26, at 3-4.
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parent's partner seeks to establish a legal relationship with the child as
well. 34
With adoption, both parents become legal parents of the co-
adopted child; the same is not true in second-parent adoption.3 5
C. Second-Parent Adoption, Legal Parentage, and the Cut-Off
Provision
In a family structure in which only one parent is the biological
parent, second-parent adoption is often thought of as the best solu-
tion to legalize the relationship between the nonbiological parent and
the child.3 6 Such a declaratory assertion of parental rights avoids the
more adversarial process of determining parentage after the dissolu-
tion of the same-sex relationship. Establishing a legal parent-child re-
lationship has enormous practical consequences. Among other
benefits, the legal relationship entitles the child to inherit from the
nonbiological parent's family directly under the law of intestate suc-
cession and to be eligible for social security benefits in the event that
the nonbiological parent dies or becomes disabled.37 It also estab-
lishes a legal obligation that requires the nonbiological parent to sup-
port the child.38
From the perspective of the nonbiological parent, many aspects
of parenthood are prohibited in the absence of legal parentage. With-
out a legally recognized relationship, the nonbiological parent is una-
ble to consent to emergency medical procedures for the child or even
obtain school records.39 Most importantly, should the relationship
with the child's biological parent dissolve or the biological parent pre-
34 See id.
35 See Laura M. Padilla, Flesh of My Flesh But Not My Heir: Unintended Disinheritance, 36
BRANDEISJ. FAM. L. 219, 231-32 (1997).
36 There are other nonlitigious options for co-parents, including co-parenting agree-
ments, prebirth decrees, and visitation agreements subsequent to the dissolution of the
relationship. See Osborne, supra note 2, at 367-68. Co-parenting agreements are simple,
contract-like legal documents outlining the particular rights and responsibilities of each
parent. Id. at 370-71. Yet, courts often refuse to enforce co-parenting agreements on the
grounds that biological parents cannot contract away any portion of their constitutional
right to guide the upbringing of their children. Id. Prebirth decrees attempt to adjudicate
parenthood from conception (be it by in vitro sperm donation, surrogacy, or other
method). Id. at 371-72. This option is only available to those parents seeking to legally
solidify their relationship with an as yet unborn child. Id. Visitation agreements, even if
prepared preemptively before the dissolution of a relationship, are often unenforceable
because courts are reluctant to allow parties to independently contract for child custody
without a court applying a best interest of the child standard. Id. at 372-74. Despite these
other attempts to avoid a postdissolution adversarial court determination of parental
rights, second-parent adoption is the most robust nonlitigious option to formally establish
a legal parent-child relationship. Id. at 367-68.
37 See Doskow, supra note 26, at 9.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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decease the nonbiological parent, the nonbiological parent will have
no claim for custody or visitation and the child will have no claim for
support.40
States differ widely in their parentage laws, but many states im-
port provisions from the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), a model law
setting forth rules for establishing the legal parent-child relation-
ship.41 A brief overview illustrating the development of parentage
laws follows.
Historically, legal parentage stemmed solely from blood and legit-
imacy.4 2 Prior to the promulgation of the UPA in 1973, the common
law set forth these basic requirements: to be a legal child, the child
had to be born to legally married parents. 43 Parentage laws assumed
and reinforced notions of the traditional family: the wife gave birth,
and the husband was presumed to be the biological father of the
child.4 4 Over time, parentage laws recognized a broader understand-
ing of family, and slowly, legal parentage extended beyond blood and
legitimacy.45 Adoption, for example, became a process to forge a par-
ent-child relationship outside of the traditional model.4 6
Advancing technologies and increasing numbers of same-sex
couples and other nontraditional families have further widened the
gap between parentage laws and the reality of a significant number of
40 See id.
41 The Uniform Law Commission (ULC), previously known as the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), promulgated a version of the
UPA in 1973. The NCCUSL approved a new version of the UPA in 2002. See Press Release,
NCCUSL, Council of State Governments Approves Two Uniform Acts as "Suggested Legis-
lation" (Jun. 1, 2009), available at http://www.nccusl.org/update/DesktopModules/News
Display.aspx?ItemlD=213. The Act reflects both federal requirements and state best prac-
tices in the paternity area. Although all states have some sort of parentage act, only nine
states have formally enacted a version of the most recent UPA: Alabama, Delaware, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. See ALA.
CODE, §§ 26-17-101 to 26-17-905 (2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-101 to 8-904 (2009);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-11-1 to 40-11-23 (LexisNexis 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-01 to
14-20-66 (2009); On.. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7700-101 to 7700-902 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. §§ 160.001 to 160.763 (West 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-15-101 to 78B-15-902
(LexisNexis 2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011 to 26.26.913 (West 2005); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-401 to 14-2-907 (2009). Colorado is currently considering adopting the
new version of the UPA. Although other states have not formally adopted the UPA, it still
influences the creation of state parentage laws. A Few Facts About the. . . Uniform Parentage
Act (Last Revised or Amendmed 2002), NCCUSL, http://nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfact
sheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
42 See Anne-Marie Rhodes, On Inheritance and Disinheritance, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST.
L.J. 433, 434-36 (2008).
43 See Unifom Parentage Act Summary, NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uni-
formactsummaries/uniformacts-s-upa.asp (last visited Nov. 28, 2009).
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 SeeJan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why (The Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on Intestate Succes-
sion and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REv. 711, 711-12 (1984).
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families.4 7 Thus, determining the legal parents of a child is increas-
ingly more complicated. To help clarify parentage laws, the Uniform
Law Commission revised the UPA in 2002 to provide states with
clearer guidelines for determining parentage under a variety of cir-
cumstances, many of which explicitly acknowledge nontraditional
family structures. 4 8 The updated 2002 UPA defines "parent-child re-
lationship" to be a specific legal relationship and articulates the re-
quirements necessary to establish that relationship. 49 A mother-child
relationship is established through birth, adjudication of maternity, or
adoption.5 0 A father-child relationship is established through an un-
rebutted presumption of paternity if the child is born during the mar-
riage between the presumed father and mother.5' A father-child
relationship is also established through effective acknowledgment of
paternity, adjudication of paternity, adoption, or consent to assisted
reproduction.5 2 The principal additions of the amended 2002 version
of the UPA sought to better address the implications of more compli-
cated family structures. For example, the amended UPA provides gui-
dance for the determination of mother-child and father-child
relationships in families created by assisted reproduction or other
modern technological method.5 3
Although the UPA recognizes some of the changing reality of
American families, it does not go far enough. For example, the UPA
does prohibit discrimination based on marital status. Acknowledging
an understanding of legal parentage beyond blood and legitimacy,
the UPA now states that "[a] child born to parents who are not mar-
ried to each other has the same rights under the law as a child born to
parents who are married to each other."54 However, this passage and
the framework of the entire UPA still impliedly posits a family headed
by a heterosexual couple as the norm.5 5
In terms of adoption, the Uniform Adoption Act (UAA) 5 6 pro-
vides that "any individual may adopt .. . for the purpose of creating
47 See discussion supra Part I.B.
48 The amended UPA in large part addresses the challenges that assisted reproduc-
tion creates. In between the UPA (1973) and the UPA (2002), the ULC developed two
other acts: the Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act (1988) and the
Uniform Putative and Unknown Fathers Act (1988). The new UPA incorporates the sub-
stance of these two earlier acts. See Uniform Parentage Act Summary, supra note 43.
49 UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 102(14) (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 13 (Supp. 2010).
50 Id. § 201(a), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2010).
51 Id. § 201(b), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2010).
52 See id.
53 Id. § 201 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2010).
54 Id. § 202, 9B U.L.A. 309 (2000).
55 Id. §§ 201 (a)-(b), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2010).
56 Similar to the UPA, the UAA is a model law proposed by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the hopes of providing a comprehensive adop-
tion code for states to adopt. The UPA provides that adoption can establish a parent-child
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the relationship of parent and child."57 The UAA comments expound
on this by stating, "Marital status, like other general characteristics
such as race, ethnicity, religion, or age, does not preclude an individ-
ual from adopting."5  Yet, the UAA does not mention homosexual
adoption or protections for same-sex families.59 Although it does not
specifically articulate second-parent adoption as a viable method of
gaining legal parentage, the UAA does address the consequences of a
second-parent adoption and provides a heteronormative solution.
The UAA states that upon a decree of adoption, "the legal relation-
ship of parent and child between each of the adoptee's former par-
ents and the adoptee terminates."60 This codification of the cut-off
provision does, however, provide a stepparent exception. 61 Under
this exception, the custodial parent may retain his or her parental sta-
tus, while the adoptive stepparent acquires the status of legal parent.62
The heteronormativity of the stepparent exception is clear in light of
the significant number of same-sex couples living in states that do not
legally recognize same-sex relationships. 63
Many states go beyond the UPA- and UAA-like silent treatment of
same-sex families by explicitly prohibiting homosexual adoption.64
While some of these prohibitions apply broadly to any two unmarried,
nonbiological parents attempting to jointly adopt a child, some are
more explicitly homophobic. As of 1977, Florida law expressly prohib-
its "homosexual" individuals from adopting.65 Similarly, as of 2000,
Mississippi law expressly prohibits "adoption by couples of the same
gender."66 Utah prohibits adoption "by a person who is cohabiting in
relationship but does not specify any particulars about what qualifies as an adoption. See id.
§§ 201 (a) (3), (b) (4), 9B U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 2010). Therefore, the UAA helps to define what
"adoption" means in the UPA.
57 UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 1-102, 9 U.L.A. 22 (1994).
58 Id. § 1-102 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 22 (1994).
59 Id.
60 Id. § 1-105, 9 U.L.A. 23 (1994).
61 Id. § 1-105 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 23-24 (1994).
62 Id. § 4-102, 9 U.L.A. 104-05 (1994). A stepparent has standing under this provision
to adopt a minor stepchild who is the child of the stepparent's spouse if (a) the spouse has
sole legal and physical custody, (b) the spouse had joint legal custody, (c) the spouse is
deceased or mentally incompetent, or (d) an agency placed the child with the stepparent.
This article does open the door for second-parent adoption outside marriage by stating,
"For good cause shown, a court may allow an individual who does not meet the require-
ments [listed above], but has the consent of the custodial parent of a minor to file a peti-
tion for adoption ... [and therefore] be treated as if [he or she] were a stepparent." See id.
Considering the amount of discretion that this provision provides to the court, however,
the ability for same-sex couples to utilize this provision remains suspect.
63 See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part I.D.
64 See sources cited infra notes 65-67.
65 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2002) ("No person eligible to adopt under
this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.").
66 Mrss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2007) ("Adoption by couples of the same gen-
der is prohibited.").
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a relationship that is not a legally valid and binding marriage."67 Utah
defines cohabitation as "residing with another person and being in-
volved in a sexual relationship with that person."68
On the opposite side of the spectrum, a handful of states explic-
itly permit legal adoption by a second parent in a same-sex relation-
ship without terminating the legal status of the biological parent.69 In
these states, "the adoptive parent stands in parity with the biological
parent and has all the rights and responsibilities that flow from legal
parenthood."70 Several of these states provide for same-sex second-
parent adoption by statute, while others have provided for same-sex
second-parent adoption through appellate court decisions.71 Ver-
mont is a unique example because it provides protection for same-sex
families through a family law code that is gender neutral, stating "[i]f
a family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner, and adop-
tion is in the best interest of the child, the partner of a parent may
adopt a child of the parent. Termination of the parent's parental
rights is unnecessary in an adoption under this subsection."72
Most states, however, are less explicit in how same-sex couples
should fare under applicable state adoption laws and how legal par-
entage shall be determined for children of same-sex couples. Without
clearly established provisions addressing same-sex second-parent
adoption, courts are left to interpret applicable state parentage laws.
The product of such interpretation often results in the story ofJill and
Patty: the biological parent's consent to the adoption of his or her
child by the nonbiological parent terminates all of the biological par-
67 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117 (LexisNexis 2008).
68 Id. Id. § 78B-6-103(10).
69 Second-parent adoption is available by statute in California, Connecticut, and Ver-
mont. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 9000(g) (West Supp. 2010) (allowing only registered
domestic partners to adopt without terminating the legal status of the biological parent);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-724(a) (3) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002).
Although these statutes are based on the UAA, they go beyond the scope of the Act, which
does not explicitly provide for second-parent adoption in the same-sex setting. Appellate
court decisions in the following jurisdictions have also approved second-parent adoption:
California, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, NewJersey, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Vermont. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554, 562-63 (Cal.
2003); In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 862 (D.C. 1995); In re Petition of KM., 653 N.E.2d 888,
898 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In re Adoption of Infant K.S.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1260 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2004); In re Adoption of M.M.G.C., 785 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003);
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993); In re Adoption of Two Children by
H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 540-41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); In reJacob, 660 N.E.2d 397,
405-06 (N.Y. 1995); In re Adoption of R.B.F., 803 A.2d 1195, 1202 (Pa. 2002); Adoption of
B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993).
70 See Osborne, supra note 2, at 369.
71 See sources cited supra note 70.
72 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102(b) (2002)
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ent's rights and duties.7 3 As discussed previously, this forced divest-
ment results from an explicit cut-off provision typical of most state
adoption laws.74
States passed adoption statutes with cut-off provisions in order to
effectuate a "fresh start" policy that protects the new adoptive parents
from claims of the child's biological parents.7 5 The fresh start policy
rests on the assumption that the best interest of the child entails cut-
ting all emotional or financial ties to the biological parents and com-
pletely immersing the child in the new adoptive family.7 6 In joint
adoptions by two nonbiological parents, the purpose of the "fresh
start" policy is more salient, necessitating terminations of birth par-
ents' rights prior to adoption proceedings.7 7  However, the cut-off
provision and the "fresh start" policy underlying the provision do not
take into account intrafamilial second-parent adoptions. Recognizing
that the best interest of the child in such intrafamilial adoptions is to
maintain a legal relationship with both the biological parent and new
adoptive parent, states added the "spousal/stepparent" exception to
prevent any divestment of legal parental interest on behalf of the bio-
logical parent.7 8 Although recognizing the importance of in-
trafamilial second-parent adoptions by heterosexual couples, state
laws have not accorded same-sex families the same protections.
73 See, e.g., In re Adoption of T.K.J. 931 P.2d 488, 491 (Colo. App. 1996); In re Adop-
tion of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Neb. 2002); In re Adoption of Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071,
1071-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
74 For an example of a cut-off provision, see UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 1-105, 9 U.L.A. 23
(1994). For further examples, see also discussion and sources cited supra notes 56-63.
75 See In reEstates of Donnelly, 502 P.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Wash. 1972) (stating that the
purpose of these types of severing provisions gives the adopted child a "'fresh start' by
treating him as the natural child of the adoptive parent, and severing all ties with the
past.").
76 See Rein, supra note 46, at 717 ("[Slociety generally deems it in the adoptee's best
interests to make him a full-fledged member of his adoptive family. This assimilation can
occur only if the adopting family treats the adoptee in all respects, including matters of
succession, as though he had been born into his adoptive family. Furthermore, it is appar-
ent that an adoptee's retention of ties with his biological family can undermine the psycho-
logical aspect of this assimilation.").
77 New York's statute, which includes a typical cut-off provision, illustrates this point.
The New York adoption statute provides, "[a]fter the making of an order of adoption the
birth parents of the adoptive child . .. shall have no rights over such adoptive child." N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAw § 117(1) (a) (McKinney Supp. 2010); see also MASs. ANN. LAws ch. 210, § 6
(LexisNexis 2009) ("[A]II rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural rela-
tion of child and parent shall . .. terminate between the child so adopted and his natural
parents and kindred. . . .").
78 Wis. STAT. § 48.92(2) (2010) ("After the order of adoption is entered the relation-
ship of parent and child between the adopted person and the adopted person's birth par-
ents ... unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive parent. . . shall be completely
altered and those rights, duties, and other legal consequences shall cease to exist.").
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D. Impact of Same-Sex Marriage Laws7 9
Many same-sex families reside in the majority of states that do not
currently legally recognize same-sex marriages. In these states, nonbi-
ological parents are not legally acknowledged as "spouses" or "steppar-
ents" and do not qualify for the spousal/stepparent exception.8 0 The
Comments to UPA Article 4, the main provision establishing adoption
of minor stepchildren by a stepparent, provides a rationale for the
stepparent exception: "[the exception is] justified because in the typi-
cal stepparent adoption, the minor has been living with the steppar-
ent and the stepparent's spouse . . . , and the adoption merely
formalizes a de facto parent-child relationship . . . . [T]he minor's
custodial parent has in effect 'selected' the adoptive stepparent on the
basis of personal knowledge."8 1 These factors justifying the spousal/
stepparent exception are arguably equally present in a committed
same-sex partnership. It is important, therefore, to recognize that the
legal status of a same-sex relationship directly impacts a significant
number of parent-child relationships.
Marriage-like recognition of same-sex relationships can provide
automatic legal parentage by way of the legal connection between the
parents. For example, if same-sex marriage were available, a married
lesbian couple
engaging in reproduction through artificial insemination would not
need to take any steps at all to protect the rights of the partner who
did not carry the child, as the latter would be considered to be in
the same position as the husband of a heterosexual woman who is
inseminated with the semen of another man. In such a situation,
the law deems the husband the legal parent of a child born as a
result of the insemination, despite the absence of genetic
connection.8 2
79 Staying current on the status of same-sex marriage laws across the country is nearly
impossible. Some of these states, such as California and Maine, provided legal recognition
of same-sex relationships by court decision, but public referendum removed the judicially
granted protections. See Phillippe Naughton and David Byers, California Votes to Ban Gay
Marriage, THE SUNDAY TIMEs (Nov. 5, 2008), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/usand-americas/us-elections/article5091994.ece; Michael Falcone, Maine Vote
Repeals Gay Marriage Law, POLITICO (Nov. 4, 2009 1:29 AM), http://now.politico.com/news/
stories/1109/29119.html. Most recently, the mayor of the District of Columbia signed into
law a same-sex marriage bill. See Tim Craig et al., Washington Mayor Fenty Signs Same-Sex
Marriage Bill, WASH. PosT (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/article/2009/12/18/AR2009121801789.html.
80 See UNIF. ADOPTON Acr § 4-108(a) (2), 9 U.L.A. 108-09 (1994) ("A petition by a
stepparent to adopt a minor stepchild must be signed and verified by the petitioner and
contain . . . the current marital status of the petitioner, including the date and place of
marriage, the name and date and place of birth of the petitioner's spouse ...
81 Id. § 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 103 (1994).
82 See Doskow, supra note 26, at 4-5.
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Additionally, in states that provide legal recognition of same-sex un-
ions, the spousal/stepparent exception arguably covers homosexual
couples if the recognition bestows a legal status of "spouse" or "step-
parent." Discriminatory marriage laws, therefore, place burdens not
only on homosexual couples but on their children as well.83
Although a majority of states provide no legal recognition for ho-
mosexual couples, a few states substantially deviate from this norm.84
Currently, eleven jurisdictions provide either full marriage equality or
broad relationship recognition laws: California, Connecticut, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.85 Of these, Connecticut,
the District of Columbia, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Vermont all provide full marriage equality.86 The rest provide broad
relationship-recognition laws that extend to same-sex couples all, or
nearly all, of the rights and responsibilities that married couples have
under state law. Although the particular legal status that some of
these states grant same-sex couples is a "civil union" or "domestic part-
nership," the legal protections behind the particular status vernacular
are almost identical to those provided under heterosexual marriage.8 7
In Baker v. State,88 for example, the Supreme Court of Vermont held
that "the State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex
couples the common benefits and protections that flow from marriage
under Vermont law."89 Soon afterwards, the legislature formally de-
fined these protections by enacting the Civil Union Act9o on July 1,
2000, which affords same-sex couples all the legal benefits of marriage
without the specific status declaration. One provision of the Civil
Union Act specifically relates to parentage: "The rights of parties to a
civil union, with respect to a child of whom either becomes the natu-
ral parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as
those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either
spouse becomes the natural parent during the marriage."9 1 There-
fore, even without an explicit allowance for same-sex second-parent
83 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 963 (Mass. 2003) ("[T]he
task of child rearing for same-sex couples is made infinitely harder by their status as outli-
ers to the marriage laws . . . . [S]ame-sex couples who dissolve their relationships find
themselves and their children in the highly unpredictable terrain of equity jurisdiction.").
84 See Relationship Recognition for Same-Sex Couples in the U.S., NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN
TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issuemaps/rel-recog_3_
10_color.pdf.
85 Id.
86 Id.; Ian Urbina, D.C. Council Approves Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 15, 2009),
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/16/us/16marriage.html.
87 NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 84.
88 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
89 Id. at 867.
90 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (LexisNexis 2002).
91 Id. tit. 15, § 1204(f).
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adoption similar to parent-child determinations in heterosexual mar-
riage, the Vermont statute goes as far as implying a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the nonbiological, nonadoptive parent is a legal parent
who derives this relationship with the child simply by virtue of the civil
union.92 Even though the spousal exception for second-parent adop-
tion would be available here, it is not necessary to provide legal pro-
tection for the nonbiological parent.
In California, the status of "domestic partnership" is available for
any two adults, regardless of the gender of the individuals, and be-
stows marriage-like rights and benefits.9 3 A domestic partnership pro-
vides the same parental rights to the nonbiological, nonadoptive
parent as his or her partner.94 The statute also extends recognition to
any domestic partnership bestowed by another state (up to the same
level of protection that California provides) .9
For the other states in this category, which recognize marriage-
like homosexual relationships that do not entail full marriage rights,
the question of whether the legal status that they grant can provide
either de facto legal parentage for nonbiological parents (similar to
states providing full marriage equality) or even qualification as a
"spouse" under the cut-off exception is less clear.
A few states provide very limited recognition and protection for
same-sex couples: Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, and Wiscon-
sin. 9 6 Hawaii, for example, allows persons to obtain legal recognition
for their relationship by registering as "reciprocal beneficiaries."9 7 Re-
ciprocal beneficiaries do not have all of the rights of married couples,
but many statutory provisions now extend to reciprocal beneficiaries
the same rights as spouses.98 For example, for purposes of intestacy,
Hawaiian law provides a surviving reciprocal beneficiary with the same
intestate share that it would provide to a surviving spouse.99 Unfortu-
nately, the statute does not define the effect of such status on determi-
nations of child custody, visitation rights, and other rights of
parentage.100 Whether the couple's legal classification as reciprocal
beneficiaries will provide parental rights for nonbiological parents
92 Id.
93 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297(a) (West 2004).
94 Id. § 297.5(d) (providing, similar to Vermont's Civil Union Act, that a nonadoptive,
nonbiological partner is a legal "parent," with all the corresponding rights of visitation and
custody); see also id. § 9000 (extending stepparent adoption to adoption by a "domestic
partner" as defined in Section 297).
95 Id. § 299.2.
96 See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 84.
97 lAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (2006).
98 Id. § 572C-6.
99 Id. § 560:2-102.
100 Id. § 572C-6.
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and whether that classification will provide access to the spousal ex-
ception remains suspect.
Finally, the following thirty-three states provide no legal recogni-
tion for same-sex couples: Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.10 '
A separate issue from a state's own laws regarding same-sex mar-
riage concerns recognition of other states' same-sex marriage laws.
Arguably, states that recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states should also provide the opportunity to utilize the spousal excep-
tion if the other state bestows a legal status comparable to that of a
spouse. Currently, only New York and Maryland fully acknowledge
out-of-state same-sex marriages.102
II
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE CUT-OFF PROBLEM
Most state adoption laws are similar to the Uniform Adoption Act
in including a cut-off provision and a spousal/stepparent exception,
but also remaining silent on same-sex families. Because most states do
not provide any legal recognition of same-sex partnerships, the story
of Jill and Patty remains all too familiar. However, there are several
possible solutions to prevent the cut-off provision from forcing same-
sex families to choose one parent to be a legal parent and the other to
be a legal stranger.
One possible solution does not rely on legislative change orjudi-
cial discretion. Instead, it depends on a specific course of action by
the co-parents. In order to avoid the cut-off provision terminating the
biological parent's rights, and thereby prohibiting both co-parents
from each forming a legal bond with their child, the biological parent
may willingly terminate his or her parental rights to the child in order
to become a joint adoptive parent alongside his or her partner.103 If
the court approves the adoption, then both parents will be legal par-
ents for all purposes. However, this is not an ideal solution for several
reasons. Formally terminating the legal relationship between a bio-
logical parent and child has severe financial and psychological conse-
quences:104 two-parent adoption is often more expensive than second-
101 See NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, supra note 84.
102 See id.
103 See Osborne, supra note 2, at 368.
104 See id.
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parent adoption, 05 and furthermore, the family as a whole may suffer
"emotional discomfort in having to abdicate biologically vested
rights." 06
Utilizing the discretion of the court to independently adjudicate
parentage is another possible solution. 10 7 While "[a]doption is a pro-
cess by which the [Department of Social Services] and the courts de-
termine whether the petitioner can be made a parent of the
child . .[,]a UPA petition argues that the respondent is already a par-
ent, and seeks the court's acknowledgment of that existing parental
relationship."108 Under the UPA, and likewise under most state stat-
utes, judges have significant discretion in adjudicating parentage.
The court is vested with the power to ascertain parenthood, looking
specifically at the petitioning individual and that individual's relation-
ship with the child in question.109 However, similar to the solution
discussed above, adjudicating parentage is costly, both emotionally
and financially.110 More importantly, this solution is only possible if
the state parentage statute recognizes nonbiological grounds for par-
entage.'11 Even if the statute recognizes nonbiological grounds, such
as de facto parenthood based on functional aspects of the par-
ent-child relationship, "the cases have not ... determined that a func-
tional parent will have all the rights of a biological or [formal]
adoptive parent."' 1 2 Finally, this solution does not preemptively estab-
lish a legal parent-child relationship, but rather it is usually only avail-
able after a relationship dissolves and the court ascertains parentage
for the purposes of custody and other parental rights.113
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 386.
108 See Doskow, supra note 26, at 21.
109 See Osborne, supra note 2, at 388.
110 Id. at 388.
111 For example, the American Law Institute's (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution offers a legal framework that recognized the realities of nontraditional families
in ascertaining parentage. The ALI's Principles recognize both parents by estoppel and de
facto parentage. According to the ALI Principles, a parent by estoppel is one who, al-
though not a biological or adoptive parent, meets certain circumstantial requirements of
parenthood. Once the parent meets these requirements, he or she has the rights and
privileges of a legal parent. A de facto parent, on the other hand, is an individual who
lived with the child for more than two years and, with the agreement of the legal parent,
formed a parent-child relationship for reasons other than financial compensation. A per-
son trying to demonstrate de facto parenthood must meet many requirements, including
showing substantial caretaking functions. Under the ALI's framework, only parents by es-
toppels, and not de facto parents, stand in complete parity with legal parents. See generally
AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE, Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recom-
mendations (2002).
112 See Gary, supra note 3, at 668.
113 See Osborne, supra note 2, at 391.
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Another possible solution is promulgating state legislation, such
as the Uniform Parentage Act, that would explicitly define second-
parent adoption in gender neutral terms and expand the spousal/
stepparent exception to include same-sex families. However, the pos-
sibility of passing such a large measure, especially in the midst of the
current nationwide battle over same-sex marriage, is highly unrealis-
tic. Legalizing same-sex marriage is also clearly a solution as discussed
in Part I.C, but similar to changing state parentage laws, the prospect
of legalizing same-sex marriage nationwide, and thereby including
same-sex families under the spousal/stepparent exception, is imprac-
tical at this point. The more practical, immediate solution would be a
more inclusive interpretation of existing laws rather than an ex-
panded exception or, even more dramatic, a completely new frame-
work by which to establish parental rights.
Courts employ several possible strategies in attempting to read
adoption statues in a way that invokes the true legislative intent-pro-
moting the "best interest of the child"-and thereby prevents the dev-
astating effects of the cut-off provision. In Sharon S. v. Superior
Court,1 1 4 a landmark California Supreme Court case, the court offers a
unique and thoughtful solution to the cut-off provision. In the case of
a same-sex second-parent adoption, the majority treats the adoption
as simultaneous, not sequential,"' 5 thereby preserving biological par-
entage and adding additional rights of legal parentage for the nonbio-
logical parent." 6 The court does not take an overly activist position; it
does not broadly read the stepparent exception to include same-sex
families, which would violate the literal language of the statute.
Rather, the court finds a solution within the established framework of
existing state law defining legal parent-child relationships." 7
Section 8617 of the California Family Code provides: "The birth
parents of an adopted child are, from the time of the adoption, re-
lieved of all parental duties towards, and all responsibility for, the
adopted child, and have no right over the child." 18 Faced with a typi-
cal cut-off provision, the court's solution is simple: read the California
cut-off provision as a waivable benefit, rather than a mandatory pre-
requisite for a valid adoption.o19 The court therefore reiterates the
previously recognized power of an individual to "waive. compliance
with statutory conditions intended for his or her benefit, so long as
14 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
115 Note again that these are terms of art that I use to describe the California Supreme
Court's approach in Sharon S.
"6 Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 561.
117 See id.
118 Id. at 560.
"19 Id.
156 [Vol. 96:139
SAME-SEX SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
the Legislature has not made those conditions mandatory."1 20 In this
context, the court determined that "nothing [in Section 8617,] or in
any other statutory provision, prohibits the parties to an independent
adoption from waiving the benefits of section 8617 when a birth par-
ent intends and desires to coparent with another adult who has
agreed to adopt the child and share parental responsibilities." 1 2 1 To
support its assertion that the cut-off provision was not meant to be
mandatory, the court demonstrates that all requirements for a valid
adoption are present even if the cut-off provision is waivable. There-
fore "the objective of the adoption statutes . . . is not frustrated when
statutory provisions like section 8617 are treated as nonmandatory."122
Furthermore, in Marshall v. Marshall,'23 a decision establishing the
stepparent exception in California, the court already recognized that
a birth parent consenting to an adoption may waive termination of
her parental rights. In Sharon S., the court simply found there was
nothing confining this approach to the stepparent context.124
Simultaneous adoption, which the court makes possible by defin-
ing the cut-off provision as a waivable benefit and not a mandatory
requirement, effectuates what the court believes to be the legislature's
true intent. In drafting the state family code, the court believes "the
Legislature did not intend . . . to bar an adoption when the parties
clearly intended to waive the operation of that statute and agreed to
preserve the birth parent's rights and responsibilities."125
Other courts have also found simultaneous adoption to be an at-
tractive solution for the cut-off provision.126 In promoting "the best
interest of the child," courts treat the cut-off provision as a guiding
statement and not a mandatory law. Ultimately, they find that divest-
ing the rights of one parent in favor of another is not in a child's best
interest. 27 Courts addressing this issue have argued that divesting the
120 Id. at 561.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 562 (internal quotations omitted).
123 239 P. 36 (Cal. 1925).
124 See Sharon S., 73 P.3d at 566.
125 Id. at 560; see also Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Mass. 1993) ("The
Legislature obviously did not intend that a natural parent's legal relationship to its child be
terminated when the natural parent is a party to the adoption petition.").
126 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Carolyn B., 774 N.Y.S.2d 227, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(allowing two unmarried adults to adopt simultaneously, rather than sequentially).
127 See, e.g., In re Adoption of Infant KS.P., 804 N.E.2d 1253, 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
("It is clear that the divesting statute, designed as a shield to protect new adoptive families,
was never intended as a sword to prohibit otherwise beneficial intrafamily adoptions by
second parents."); Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 319 ("While the Legislature may not have envi-
sioned adoption by same-sex partners, there is no indication that it attempted to define all
possible categories of persons leading to adoptions in the best interests of children. Rather
than limit the potential categories of persons entitled to adopt . . . , the Legislature used
general language to define who may adopt and who may be adopted."); In reJacob, 660
N.E.2d 397, 399 (N.Y. 1995) ("[T]he adoption statute must be applied in harmony with the
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legal parental relationship between a child and his or her biological
parent, which is the consequence of applying most adoption statutes
to a same-sex couple second-parent adoption, could not be the actual
legislative intent behind the cut-off provision.128 Even if a discussion
of legislative intent is somewhat moot because state legislatures did
not consider same-sex second-parent adoption while drafting adop-
tion laws, "[w]hen social mores change, governing statutes must be
interpreted to allow for those changes in a manner that does not frus-
trate the purposes behind their enactment. To deny the children of
same-sex partners, as a class, the security of a legally recognized rela-
tionship with their second parent serves no legitimate state
interest."129
III
INTESTACY LAW AND THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
The debate surrounding second-parent adoption and the deter-
mination of legal parenthood directly impacts the law of succession.130
Legal recognition of a parent-child relationship is vital for both intes-
tacy and testacy purposes. If a succession document does not provide
an adequate definition, a court will look to intestacy laws for assistance
in determining the meaning of terms like "child" and "descen-
dent."13' More importantly, how a state's probate code defines a par-
ent-child relationship in its intestacy laws is important, given that
most people die intestate.132
Testamentary freedom-an individual's right to control the dis-
position of their property-is at the heart of American estate law.133
humanitarian principle that adoption is a means of securing the best possible home for a
child.").
128 See In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 845 (D.C. 1995) ("'The canon in favor of strict
construction is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statu-
tory purpose .... [T]he canon does not require distortion or nullification of the evident
meaning and purpose of the legislation."' (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18,
25-26 (1948))); In re Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 539 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995) ("When the statute is read as a whole, we see that its general purpose is
to clarify and protect the legal rights of the adopted person at the time the adoption is
complete, not to proscribe adoptions by certain combinations of individuals .... The
legislature recognized that it would be against common sense to terminate the biological
parent's rights when that parent will continue to raise and be responsible for the child,
albeit in a family unit with a partner who is biologically unrelated to the child." (quoting
Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993))).
129 B.L.VB., 628 A.2d at 1275.
130 For a general discussion of the impact of the changing American family on Ameri-
can estates law, see Tritt, supra note 32, at 41.
131 Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition ofParent and Child for Succession Purposes,
34 ACTEc J. 171, 171, 185 (2008).
132 Id. at 178-79.
133 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 374; see also john T. Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly Modern
Wills Act, 31 U. MtAmi L. REv. 497, 502 (1977) ("[T]he very existence of a history of succes-
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Individuals exercise this right through wills, other will-like instruments
(e.g., trusts, contracts, life insurance, and pension plans), and intes-
tacy statutes.13 4 The latter of the three, intestacy statutes, mandate the
recipients of a decedent's estate and are meant to act as a proxy for
the testator's intent should the testator die without a will.1 35 There-
fore, if the intestate statute does not recognize the individual's rela-
tionship with the child as a legal parent-child relationship, then it will
not effectively approximate the likely intent of the intestate parent to
pass on his or her property.13 6
Determining the presence of a legal parent-child relationship is
especially important in intestacy law. In most state intestate regimes, a
decedent's children have priority over most other surviving relatives;
therefore, intestate statutes must clearly define the requirements for a
legally recognized parent-child relationship.' 3 7 Children must also
be defined for the purposes of class gifts.' 3 8 Children not legally de-
fined by the applicable state intestate statute to be in a parent-child
relationship with the decedent will not have standing as an intestate
heir to contest the decedent's will or intestate disposition. 39 It is also
important to note that the special importance of establishing a par-
ent-child relationship for the purposes of intestacy laws extends be-
yond inheritance and property succession. The Social Security Act,
for example, determines eligibility of dependent children of a de-
ceased parent for benefits by determining whether the child is in a
legal parent-child relationship with the decedent under the state's in-
testacy law.' 40
Although a full history of intestate law is beyond the scope of this
Note, a brief discussion of intestate law is necessary to understand the
important role of parental determination. The "sanguinary nexus
test" is the "dominant criterion for intestacy preference assumptions
(determining whether an individual has a right to take property when
a 'parent' dies without a will), and ... the standard for class gift termi-
nology under a will or other dispositive instrument." 141 Similar to
sion law suggests the existence of the goal [of the transfer of private property upon death],
as does the existence of the institution of private property itself.").
134 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 375.
135 Id. at 382.
136 See T.P. Gallanis, Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, and the Movement for Same-Sex Equal-
ity, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 1513, 1522 (1999) (stating that the official comments to the UPC state
that intestacy rules in the probate code are "explicitly designed to mirror the likely intent
of the . . . decedent").
137 See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepfamilies in the Law of Intestate Succession and Wills, 22
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 917, 920 (1989).
18 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 382.
139 Id. at 380.
140 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d) (3), 416(h) (2) (A) (2006).
141 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 369.
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adoption laws, there is no federal law of succession in the United
States: state law governs property succession and estate laws.14 2 For
the purposes of this Note, discussion of intestacy law will analyze the
Uniform Probate Code (UPC) as the "model American law governing
the transfer of property at death."14 3 Although state probate statutes
vary, the UPC is representative of most state probate provisions. 144
The UPC articulates the law of intestate succession and provides sub-
stantive rules regarding execution and revocation of wills and other
such instruments.145 If a state adopts the UPA, then the UPA defines
the parent-child relationship for all purposes in the state, including
for intestacy, unless the law of the state provides otherwise.146 How-
ever, recent UPC amendments, where adopted, explicitly provide oth-
erwise and will govern for intestacy purposes.14 7
A critique of current intestacy statutes follows a common critique
of state parentage laws: they fail to reflect the reality of the changing
landscape of the American family.148 Same-sex second-parent adop-
tion, for example, is a direct affront to the entrenched model in estate
law that defines succession in terms of blood ties. The 2008 UPC
Amendments attempted to expand the definition of parent-child re-
142 Id. at 379 n.49.
143 Id. at 372 n.12.
144 Id. at 374 n.15.
145 Id. at 372 n.12
146 UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 203 (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 310 (2000) ("Unless pa-
rental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship established under this [Act] ap-
plies for all purposes, except as otherwise specifically provided by other law of this state.");
see also UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 4-103, 9 U.L.A. 106 (1994) ("An adoption by a stepparent
does not affect. .. the right of the adoptee or a descendant of the adoptee to inheritance
or intestate succession through or from the adoptee's former parent."). However, this only
applies to stepparent adoptions and not to second-parent adoptions generally.
147 The UPC amendments modify various aspects of the definition of parent and child
for intestacy purposes. There is an advantage to basing inheritance on the determination
of a legal parent under the UPA rather than under the recent amendments to the UPC.
The recent amendments include a cut-off provision: a genetic parent will cease to be a
parent for intestacy purposes if his or her unmarried partner adopts the child. Under the
UPA, however, the genetic parent remains a legal parent for purposes of inheritance. See
UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr § 203 and cmt. (amended 2002), 9B U.L.A. 310 (2000).
148 See Gary, supra note 131, at 172; see also Ralph C. Brashier, Children and Inheritance
in the Nontraditional Family, 1996 UTAH L. REv. 93, 94-95 ("One of the increasingly notable
shortcomings of modern probate law is its failure to provide adequate guidelines gov-
erning the inheritance rights of children outside the traditional nuclear family."); Mary
Louise Fellows et al., Committed Partners and Inheritance: An Empirical Study, 16 L. & INEQUAL
iTv 1, 2-8 (1998) (noting the increasing number of same-sex couples in recent years and
criticizing the UPC for not including them within its provisions); Frances H. Foster, The
Family Paradigm ofInheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REv. 199, 200-01 (2001) ("Many of [the in-
heritance system's] rules and doctrines appear frozen in time, remnants of a bygone era of
nuclear families bound together by lifelong affection and support."); E. Gary Spitko, The
Expressive Function of Succession Law and the Merits of Non-Marital Inclusion, 41 ARiz. L. REV.
1063, 1064 (1999) (criticizing typical intestacy statutes for "[denying] gay men and lesbians
equal donative freedom" and "[devaluing] gay men and lesbians and their relationships").
160
SAME-SEX SECOND-PARENT ADOPTION
lationships to include increasingly emerging nontraditional family
structures.149 However, the overly complicated amendments maintain
the sanguinary nexus test, only expanding the scope of the legally de-
fined parent-child relationship to include (a) children of an adjudi-
cated legal parent, (b) adopted children, (c) nonmarital children,
and (d) a limited exception for stepparent and intrafamily adopted
children, as well as other previously unrecognized relationships.15 0
Thus, although seeking to "redefine" the existing definition of par-
ent-child relationship, the 2008 UPC Amendments "retain [the] relic
[of the sanguinary nexus test] and slap band-aids on it. . . to account
for a few specific and selective relationships that fall outside of the
traditional genetic definition, such as adopted children and children
born of certain [assisted-reproduction technologies] ."151
Two of the new amended provisions, UPC Sections 2-118 and 2-
119, specifically address adopted children. However, these amend-
ments "do not adequately address the emerging issue of second-par-
ent adoptions by gay and lesbian couples and the interplay with state
marriage or partnership laws."15 2 The Amended UPC sections se-
verely limit the right of adopted children to inherit from their
nongenetic parents, providing a right to inherit only where the ge-
netic parent's spouse is adopting the adoptee. Stemming from the
same intent as state adoption laws, to preserve the new adoptive family
against claims from the severed biological parent, the UPC provides
that for intestacy purposes, "an adoptive child is the child of the
adopting parents and not of the child's biological parents. . . .
[A]doption [therefore] cuts off the right of inheritance as between
the adopted child and the biological relatives, thereby effectuating the
'fresh start' policy."153
Thus, the adoptive parents become the intestacy parents. 54
"Under UPC section 2-114, an adopted child is the child of the adopt-
ing parents and not of the child's biological parents."15 5 Adoption,
for intestacy purposes, cuts off the right of inheritance as between the
adopted child and the biological relatives and creates inheritance
rights in the adopted child's adoptive family.15 6 Similar to state adop-
tion laws, the UPC provides several exceptions to the rule that adop-
149 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 379 n.54, 407. Note that no state has yet adopted the
2008 UPC amendments.
150 UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-116 to 2-122 (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 54-67 (Supp.
2010).
151 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 372.
152 Id. at 409 n.309.
153 Id. at 409.
154 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-118(a) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 55 (Supp. 2010).
155 See Gary, supra note 3, at 656.
156 Id.
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tion cuts off inheritance rights between the adopted child and the
genetic parents.157
One exception continues a provision that existed in the UPC
before the 2008 Amendments. In stepparent adoptions, the parent
who is no longer a legal parent (the parent who died or gave up pa-
rental rights) remains a parent for inheritance by the child or a de-
scendent of the child from or through the parent.15 8 Following a
stepparent adoption, the genetic parent who is no longer a legal par-
ent will not inherit from the child, but a child will still inherit from or
through that genetic parent, even if the parent permitted the adop-
tion of the child by the child's stepparent. 59 Just as in state adoption
laws, the UPC provides exceptions to the "fresh start" divestment pol-
icy-including the stepparent exception'60 and the spouse excep-
tion.16 1 These exceptions, as well as the exception for children
adopted by a relative or surviving spouse of a relative1 6 2 or after the
death of both genetic parents,163 allow the child to continue to inherit
from or through the biological parent.
These exceptions do not cover second-parent adoptions by un-
married couples-a genetic parent will cease to be a parent for intes-
tacy purposes if his or her unmarried partner adopts the child. Thus,
analogous to state adoption laws, many same-sex families are left un-
protected. In states where same-sex marriage or other legal recogni-
tion of same-sex relationships is not available, the UPC would limit the
rights of that child to the intestate succession of one of the parents.
In effect, the parents would have to choose who would be the "legal"
parent under the parent-child definition of the UPC, meaning which
parent the child could automatically inherit from, have standing to
contest a will, or be labeled an interested heir. "For example, if the
genetic mother in a lesbian couple wishes her partner to adopt the
child, the genetic mother risks her child being unable to inherit from
the genetic mother because this scenario does not fit one of the ex-
157 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(e) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 56-57 (Supp. 2010).
158 Id. § 2-119(b), 8 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2010); see also id. § 2-118, 8 U.L.A. 55 (Supp.
2010). Analogous to adoption statutes, the UPC provides a spousal/stepparent exception
in section 2-119 (formerly section 2-114(b)), which states that an adoption "by the spouse
of either genetic parent" does not affect the intestate rights between the child and the
biological parent who is the spouse of the adoptive parent and does not affect the rights of
the child to inherit form or through the biological parent who either is deceased or has
given up parental rights. The exception covers only stepparents, utilizing the word
spouse." Same-sex families are thus left out.
159 Id.
160 Id. § 2-119(h), 8 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2010).
161 Id. § 2-119(c), 8 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2010).
162 Id.
163 Id. § 2-119(d), 8 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2010).
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ceptions to the 2-119 (a) severing the parent-child relationship be-
tween an adoptee and the adoptee's genetic parents."164
IV
SOLUTIONS TO THE CUT-OFF PROBLEM IN
THE UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
As discussed more fully above, the UPC contains a cut-off provi-
sion similar to those in state adoption laws.165 Analogous to state
adoption laws, the UPC contains a spousal/stepparent exception,'16 6
but most same-sex couples live in states that do not explicitly allow
marriage-like legal status. Therefore, the same problem occurs-the
nonbiological same-sex parent adoption divests the legal relationship
between the child and the biological parent and, in doing so, destroys
the link necessary for intestacy inheritance and may even destroy any
standing to contest wills or other testate instruments.
One often articulated solution to the intestacy statutes' failure to
reflect the diversity of American families involves implementing an en-
tirely new framework for parent-child determinations in intestacy law.
State intestacy laws utilize formal definitions to bestow a particular sta-
tus on individuals, establishing who qualifies as a family member for
the purposes of inheritance.1 6 7 To qualify as a family member under
most succession laws, "a surviving individual must have been married
to the decedent or related to the decedent genetically or by adop-
tion."168 Some commentators have argued that the current status-
based scheme should be replaced by a functionally based approach
that inquires into the existence, or lack thereof, of a parent-child re-
lationship as the sole means for determining child status for purposes
of succession laws.169
While this functional framework might protect same-sex families
from the cut-off provision, "[e]xpanding intestacy rights to include
functional relationships is fraught with risks." 17 0 First, the prospect of
changing such a long held model is somewhat unrealistic. Even
amending the state probate statute to formally recognize same-sex sec-
ond-parent adoption or providing a broader exception would be
difficult.
Second, even if implementing this new framework was politically
feasible, it would be administratively inefficient and burdensome and
164 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 409 n.309.
165 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-119(a) (amended 2008), 8 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2010).
166 See id. § 2-119(b), 8 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 2010).
167 See Gary, supra note 3, at 653-54.
168 See Tritt, supra note 32, at 379.
169 See id. at 403-04.
170 See Gary, supra note 3, at 673.
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would subject individuals to the discretionary decision making of
judges, who might be potentially biased against nontraditional fami-
lies. 71 Thus, providing additional court discretion might actually
lead to less inclusiveness of nontraditional families in intestate laws. 172
"Giving a court discretion to determine inheritance rights between
family members raises concerns about the societal norms that may un-
derlie a court's decision. Ajudge who disapproves of a family headed
by gay or lesbian partners may be unlikely to find that a parent-child
relationship existed, regardless of the evidence."73 In addition to po-
tential bias, increasing judicial discretion would introduce more un-
certainty into succession law, which is already very complex.174
Third, a functional analysis would allow individuals to inherit who
perhaps should not be entitled to intestacy rights.175 A close relation-
ship with a neighbor, for example, might be enough to inherit under
a functional analysis, and such a relationship is arguably not one that
approximates the intent of the decedent.
Finally, keeping an open functional relationship does not provide
the incentive for parents to legalize their relationships with their chil-
dren. Such formalized relationships create an easy way to determine
status for the surviving beneficiary and are more likely to carry out the
decedent's intent. 76 Generally, therefore, legalizing relationships is a
good action to promote. However, a more functional model would
encourage couples to just wait and let a court bestow parentage
through a functional determination. Thus, similar to adoption statues
and the solutions discussed in Part II, the best solution in the intestacy
law context is applying the simultaneous adoption solution articulated
in Sharon S.
The simultaneous adoption solution to the cut-off provision in
adoption statutes, as I articulated in Part II, should apply to the par-
ent-child relationship provisions in state probate laws. Applying the
Sharon S. simultaneous adoption provides that a biological parent who
does not relinquish parental rights with respect to a child will con-
tinue to be treated as a parent, and the child as the parent's child, for
171 For a discussion of potential criticisms of a functionally based approach, see Tritt,
supra note 32, at 422-29. Addressing these criticisms, "[flor efficiency purposes, and be-
cause most children would fall into the blood or adopted category, [Tritt's functional ap-
proach proposes] a rebuttable presumption of a parent-child relationship in cases of
genetic children and adopted children." Id. at 423. Therefore, in essence, his proposed
solution ultimately resembles the current, more formal status-based framework.
172 "[Olne study has concluded that judges often rely on traditional conceptions of
family when evaluating same-sex second-parent adoptions." See Plowman, supra note 23, at
82.
173 See Gary, supra note 3, at 681.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 682-83.
176 Id. at 677.
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purposes of intestacy. 177 Similar to the explanation provided by the
court in Sharon S., this solution does not require a broad and activist
reading of the exception or a new, even more expansive intestate
framework. Instead, it simply provides that the cut-off provision is dis-
cretionary, not mandatory, and thus, the child's right to inherent
from the biological parent is not automatically extinguished by the
nonbiological parent's second-parent adoption.
There is a concern, however, with analogizing to adoption law
and applying the Sharon S. solution. Looking at legislative intent, the
purpose behind adoption statutes in particular and family law in gen-
eral is to effectuate the best interest of the child. However, the pur-
pose behind intestate and probate laws is to ensure testamentary
freedom and effectuate the intent of the individual. Yet, allowing an
adoptive parent to waive the "benefit" of the cut-off provision demon-
strates, in a very direct way, the desire of both the biological parent
and the adoptive parent to include the child in the definition of "fam-
ily" for the purposes of inheritance.
CONCLUSION
The structure of the American family is changing as a more fluid
and flexible understanding of family replaces notions of an archetypi-
cal heterosexual nuclear family. Despite this change, however, laws
written with the traditional archetypical family in mind remain on the
books. Many areas of law, including adoption and probate laws, must
respond to the evolving concept of family, a concept increasingly in-
clusive of same-sex couples and their children. Arguing for the uni-
versal legalization of same-sex marriage as the solution is both
unrealistic and, arguably, impractical, but laws should not discrimi-
nate against same-sex couples and, more importantly, their children.
While it can be argued that the cut-off provision does not explicitly
discriminate against same-sex couples and their children, it has an un-
constitutionally disparate impact on children of same-sex individuals,
particularly because they are unable to access the spousal/stepparent
exception in most cases. 178 The cut-off provision might therefore vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution because it treats
177 See Gary, supra note 3, at 681.
178 If a law does not make a discriminatory classification on its face but is applied
unequally so as to practically result in unjust and illegal discrimination between persons in
similar circumstances, then the law violates the Equal Protection Clause. See Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886) (finding that a San Francisco ordinance concerning
the operation of laundries amounted to de facto discrimination in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it was applied only to laundries
operated by Chinese aliens).
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children of same-sex couples differently than children of heterosexual
couples.17 9
There is a long line of cases in which the Supreme Court has
invalidated statutes that treat illegitimate children differently than
those born in wedlock.180 In Levy v. Louisiana,"" for example, the
Court utilized the rational basis test and determined that there was no
rational reason to prevent illegitimate children from recovering under
the state's wrongful death statute.182 Although the Court's decision in
Labine v. Vincent'83 concluded the opposite, the cases are distinguisha-
ble. Labine, decided three years after Levy, passed on a Louisiana law
concerning an illegitimate child who sought a portion of her father's
property after he died.18 4 The Court held that refusing to allow this
illegitimate, unacknowledged child to inherit through intestate suc-
cession did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses
because Louisiana had a legitimate state interest in an orderly admin-
istration of succession and, therefore, there was a rational basis for the
discriminatory treatment.185 The Court noted, however, that if the de-
cedent had acknowledged his illegitimate daughter during his life-
time, then she would have been a natural child under the state's
intestacy scheme and would have inherited from his estate.'8 6 In
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,' 8 7 the Court applied intermediate
scrutiny to a worker's compensation-claim methodology and held a
"denial of equal recovery rights to dependent unacknowledged illegit-
imate [ ]" children violated the equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 8 8 Finally, in Trimble v. Gordon,'8 9 the Court
invalidated an Illinois intestacy statute limiting inheritance by intes-
tate succession to illegitimate children of the mother.190 Once again,
the Court noted the irrationality of any scheme that treated illegiti-
179 The Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
180 See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). In Levy, the Court considered whether
Louisiana could statutorily preclude illegitimate children from recovering under its wrong-
ful death statute. Id. at 69-70. Applying the rational basis test, the Court held that the
Louisiana court's construction of the wrongful death statute as denying recovery to illegiti-
mate children invidiously discriminated against these children for no rational reason. Id.
at 72. For a general discussion on the Levy case and others in this line of jurisprudence,
see The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Discrimination Against Illegitimate Children, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 123 (1976).
181 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
182 See id. at 72.
183 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
184 Id. at 533-34.
185 Id. at 535-37.
186 Id. at 536-37.
187 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
188 Id. at 165.
189 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
190 Id. at 776.
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mate and legitimate dependents differently.19' The Court upheld
Trimble a decade later in Reed v. Campbell'92 when it explicitly clarified
that Trimble was still good law.' 93 While the level of scrutiny might not
be the same in all the cases, there is a demonstrated history of Su-
preme Court precedent looking at the disparate impact of particular
statutes and requiring that states not treat children differently merely
on the basis of legitimacy.
Analogizing from these cases, the Court would most likely apply a
rational basis test to the cut-off provision and require a legitimate state
interest to hold the provision constitutional as applied to same-sex
families. There does not appear to be a state interest that would pass
constitutional muster. The "fresh start" policy, the only real reasoning
states mention behind the cut-off provision, does not provide even a
legitimate interest in the same-sex second-parent adoption context. In
fact, it goes against the child's best interest in divesting a meaningful
personal relationship of all legal merit.
191 See id. at 770-71.
192 476 U.S. 852 (1986).
193 See id. at 856.
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